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anama/Cuba

he National Executive Commission of the Popular Socialist Party Analyzes the Military Coup  
'Etat of March 10; 10 pp; Spanish; 15 March 1952; Panama City, Panama.

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Masses have been left confused by events /Batista coup of 10 March/; need new orientation, which must be based on examination of causes and objectives of coup and attitude of different classes and parties toward it.

Coup directly instigated by Yankee imperialists in line with usual reactionary policy toward Latin America. Yankees distressed by incapacity and unpopularity of Prio regime on one hand and rise of Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) on other. Imperialists favored coup by Batista in middle of 1951, as noted in Miami Herald.

Prio, afraid of losing elections to Agramonte (supported by PSP), plotted coup for 15 April 1952. Counted on Batista's support, but Batista staged own coup first. Kept Prio government from falling to popular opposition, making it possible to reorganize governing forces without stigma attached to discredited Prio regime and to disperse and confuse Orthodox forces.

The Confederacion de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC /also referred to in document as CTK/; Confederation of Workers of Cuba) called for general strike, which met almost no response. Leaders, repudiated by working masses, then placed themselves at service of new regime and sought its protection.

Orthodox Party was also caught off-balance, unable to initiate effective counteraction. Had refused to form Single Front with PSP.

New Batista government different in no essential respect from Prio government. Both represent bourgeois and Yankee imperialist interests. New government proposes no reforms and can therefore not eliminate causes of popular discontent.

Contrary to declared intent of eliminating gangsterism, Batista government has not molested gangster organizations.

New government dissolved Congress and canceled elections.

Batista is free of pressures which plagued Prio regime, but on other hand is entirely dependent on armed forces and military leaders, which will bring return to past abuses. Has sought some mass support by raising pay of soldiers, sailors, and police.

Mobilization of united masses in a Single Front can prevent the government from becoming open; reactionary. Front must formulate positive program. PSP committees, militants, and affiliates must propagandize ardently among masses. In addition, Single Front Committees, already formed, must organize masses. Workers must throw out traitors imposed on their unions and elect leaders who support unity and the Single Front and who fight for workers' demands.

Intense fight must be waged against all attempts to restrict activity of popular parties and institutions.

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FDD Abstract [REDACTED] continued:

Propaganda must emphasize role of National Democratic Front in solution of not only immediate problems but of long range ills.

Propaganda must also emphasize importance of supporting democratic organs such as La Ultima Hora, Hoy, and Fundamentos.

Minority group organizations must be supported and strengthened.

The PSP, as the Marxist-Leninist party of the Cuban proletariat, is in the vanguard of the struggle and must be supported and strengthened.

/Signed/ National Executive Commission of PSP, Juan Marinello, President, and Blas Roca, General Secretary.

/Following are reported in document as separate news items:/

Num~~e~~rous PSP offices in Interior raided and leaders held. Director of Hoy comments that gangsters are set free.

CTC comes to terms with Batista government.

Police guard withdrawn from national offices of PSP.

Batista's Minister of Interior, in interview with PSP leaders, stated that arrest of leaders in Interior was of purely local character. Instructions would be issued to prevent recurrence of such arrests, and those arrested would be released immediately.

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14 July 1952

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/Foreign document or microfilm thereof is available from CIA Library, Extension [REDACTED]